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This paper highlights the success factors of the governance of the Champagne supply chain. 
Scholars on economic organisation stress the role of the contractual enforcement to explain 
the stability of the economic exchanges and the ability of the economic and political actors to 
foster their own development (North, 1999). Our contribution detailed explicit and implicit 
mechanisms  related  to  the  vinegrower-merchant  relations  in  the  regional  system.  The 
Champagne region had the particularity to posses a double-head organisation, regrouping all 
the farms and firms involved in the agronomic, and commercial process of the regional wines. 
This private board is supported by an institutional environment, common market organisation, 
French rural acts, and national and international legislations on geographical indication. These 
legislatives and administrative components define precisely the productive and market rules. 
Rely  on  a  longitudinal  approach  we  reinterpret  the  way  the  interprofessionnal  (general) 
agreement, essential part of the governance of the regional market, evolved during decades 
(Barrère, 2003). This rereading illustrates the interdependency between explicit and implicit 
enforcement  mechanisms  which  foster  the  cooperation.  We  argue  that  asymmetric 
investments in advertising play a major role in the stability of the regional cooperation. The 
achievement  of  the  reputation  of  the  AOC  Champagne  by  massive  advertising  and 
commercial  investments  mainly  realised  by  the  negociants  is  central  to  understand  the 
convergence of both party strategies on a long term. These investments step in as catalyst of a 
negotiated  environment  and  award  the  self-enforcing  character  of  the  contracts.  It  makes 
efficient the set of private arrangements and regulatory mechanisms designed to eradicate 
opportunistic  behaviours.  During  all  the  second  part  of  the  20
th  century,  the  form  of  the 
contractual  agreements  evolved.  Governance  tools  were  added  and  suppressed.  However 
these forced or desired adaptations slightly alter the nature of the cooperative process. The 
flexibility of the private arrangement, as well as the comprehensive economic policy, ensures 
the durability of the general agreement in spite of crisis. These results backup the hypothesis 
of the new institutional economics on the necessity of complementary institutions to make the 
market efficient (Aoki, 2001). 
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Introduction 
The regional Champagne productive system has characteristics that suggest the need for a 
reinterpretation  of  the  mechanisms  of  territorial  governance  related  to  geographical 
indications  (GI).  The  abundant  literature  offered  both  by  geographers  and  economists  to 
describe territorial governance in the food or wine growing areas of France or other countries 
only  imperfectly  describes  the  nature  of  the  mechanisms  introduced  to  establish  vertical 
cooperation  (Boivin,  2010;  Kelly,  2007;  Rousset,  2004).  The  patterns  of  interpretation 
employed  give  a  synchronic  vision  of  governance  mechanisms  without  analysing  the 
trajectories for the construction of there process. Now, their effectiveness is the result of a 
succession of steps towards the construction of complex systems to allow the negotiation of 
multilateral  agreements  and  the  indispensable  enforcement  mechanisms  that  limit  the 
transaction costs and smooth the flows in local markets. In Champagne, the AOC/PDO
1 is 
complemented  by  formal  institutions,  contracts,  branch  agreements  and  regulation  also 
present  in  other  wine  producing  regions.  The  combination,  however,  presents  a  singular 
character by the collective dynamics and informal rules observed. The guideline for regulation 
of  the  Champagne  market  has  since  1941  been  based  on  a  protean  inter-professional 
agreement whose mechanisms can be appreciated in the light of recent contributions to the 
literature on neo-institutional economy (North, 2005; Mazé and Ménard, 2010). 
The institutionalist reading envisages two categories of mechanism involved in governance. 
On  the  one  hand,  institutional  arrangements,  explicit  or  implicit  contracts  that  cement 
relations between pairs of agents or between groups/lobbies, are quite frequent in the food 
industry (Ménard and Klein, 2004). On the other hand, guarantee mechanisms, legal rules, 
tribunals, third parties that accompany the arrangements to make them executive. The most 
recent work highlights the self-executing aspects of the arrangements which make them stable 
and  effective  in  the  short  or  long  term  (Aoki,  2001).  In  most  circumstances,  a  complete 
contract able to take into account all of the transactional attributes carries prohibitive costs the 
agents cannot assume. This infers the setting up of adjustment procedures, flexible contractual 
clauses  and  self-enforcement  mechanisms  (Gil  and  Marion,  2009).  The  analysis  of  these 
phenomena is based on models of execution whose purpose is to make the agreements stable 
when the long-term profit associated with this cooperative behaviour exceeds the profit of 
opportunistic behaviour (Klein, 1992, Lazzarini et al., 2004, Mazé and Ménard, 2010). Most 
often, these models are not concerned with the trajectories for the constitution of agreements 
and  the  underlying  mechanisms  that  provide  the  revenue  to  give  value  to  cooperative 
behaviour.  We  hypothesise  that  a  synchronic  reading  of  institutions  does  not  enable  the 
rigorous measurement of the changes in economic parameters, nor to understand the strategic 
expectations  of  each  clause  in  the  agreements.  The  diachronic  reading  of  the  genesis  of 
mechanisms  of  governance  provides  a  better  understanding  of  the  complementarity  and 
substitutions between the various types of guarantee and their effectiveness (North, 2005). In 
this article we attempt to associate the two approaches to improve a longitudinal study of 
localised productive systems (LPS) and to perfect our understanding of the mechanisms of 
territorial governance. This combined reading appears essential to explaining the sensitivity of 
the  relational  models  encountered  in  local  productive  system  to  variations  in  institutional 
environment. 
                                                           
1 AOC: Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée is the first regulatory framework of the Geographical Indication in France. The 
Common Agricultural Policy substitutes the Protected Denomination of Origin (PDO) in the 90’s to the national schedule. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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One of the original features of territorial governance as encountered in Champagne is that 
multilateral cooperation between the whole of the 15 to 16 thousand players in the vineyard 
and  merchant  economies  has  been  given  formal  expression  in  the  form  of  the  inter-
professional agreement resulting from a highly sophisticated process of collective decision 
making. The construction of the governance of Champagne depends on repeated, frequent and 
uninterrupted  negotiations  between  two  categories  of  player  with  partially  convergent 
interests  despite  their  very  considerable  economic  and  social  differences.  The  path 
development  of  Champagne  LPS  was  several  times  to  be  affected  by  internal  events  or 
external shocks. The changes observed in regulation procedures during the post-war decades 
resulted  from  changes  in  the  strategic  objectives  of  the  two  inter-professional  “families”. 
Cooperation between the two groups of agents commits shared objectives and a discipline that 
is hard to put into practice, since the alternatives for opportunist behaviour in the complex 
production process are numerous. Tensions regularly undermine the concrete processes of 
governance of the system. The inter-professional contract expresses a strategy shared between 
the vine grower and the wine merchant, while reflecting the balance of power between the 
two; but it also shows changes in the nature of national and community economic policies.  
The paper is organised in the following way. In section 1 we develop an analytical framework 
for mechanisms of territorial cooperation combining two approaches of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), that of self-enforcing mechanisms and that of a diachronic reading of the 
institutional distortions and re-combinations (North, 2005 ; Aoki, 2001). Section 2 supports 
our  theoretical  propositions  from  the  example  of  LPS  Champagne,  an  GI  that  has  been 
through a remarkable development accompanied by extremely specific forms of organisation. 
In this section, we come back to the foundations of the mechanism of the territorial income 
that is the guarantee of cooperation. Section 3 explains the specific strategy of the Champagne 
merchant, alone able to take on the costs of promoting the AOC to the benefit of all the 
players.  These  specific  strategic  investments  have  consequences  on  vertical  relations.  We 
conclude by highlighting the regularity of strategies in the successive regulation models and 
the long-lasting nature of the agreements. 
 
1.  Institutions in the development’s trajectories 
The  theoretical  basis  of  our  analysis  combines  the  approach  on  the  complementarity  of 
agreement  guarantee  mechanisms  and  of  institutional  changes.  Mazé  and  Ménard  (2010) 
ascribe the stability of contractual relations on a diversity of schemes aimed at guaranteeing 
the transactions and the trade-off between conserving and losing the quasi-income obtained 
by the repetition of transactions with reference to the “reputational” model of Klein (1992) – 
in  particular  savings  in  research  and  adaptative  costs  after  paying  an  entry  cost  in  an 
idiosyncratic  relation.  This  model  explains  the  robustness  of  informal  contracts  in  a  way 
where it is difficult for a third party to intervene because there is no record of the terms of the 
contract  and  the  contract  is  incomplete.  The  complementarity  of  guarantee  mechanisms 
between formal and informal mechanisms, of private institutions embedded in a regulatory 
framework enables a reduction in the costs of information and negotiation when multilateral 
agreements are activated. For North (1990, 2005), the explanatory mechanism is effective 
institutions, a selection process spread over time. Cooperation depends on the fact that the 
strategic options and psychology of agents – in particular their aversion to risk – will lead to 
the choice of more or less flexible mechanisms. This choice is contingent on opportunities 
offered by the institutional environment and not only on abstract strategic parameters. Time is 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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needed for the agents to align their strategies, to construct means of transmitting information 
and  standards  (David,  1994).  A  diachronic  reading  of  institutional  change  requires  the 
inclusion of the paths of dependence that have shaped the history of economic systems. 
1.1.  The effectiveness of guarantee mechanisms and bilateral dependence 
 
Research on self-enforcing mechanisms for cooperation is based on a general principle of 
translating the profit matrix according to the game played by the agents. From cooperation 
there results a pay-off. So long as their options conserve this quasi-rent, the agents have an 
incentive  to  cooperate.  This  self-enforcement  process  backs  up  explicit  guarantee 
mechanisms. (Aoki, 2001; Traversac, 2011). 
 
·  Economic  activities  are  embebded  a  framework  of  judicial  and  legal  rules.  Those 
adopted for agricultural production systems are part of the rural code to cope with the 
hazards of seasonality of production, sanitary risks and the small size of structures 
from  standardised  contracts  and  schemes  aimed  at  favouring  negotiations  between 
upstream and downstream players. 
·  Collusive mechanisms. Second level organisations increase the negotiating power of 
their members by grouping the supply and sharing the assets. The cooperatives bring 
coordination outside the market which reduces the uncertainty for the producers by 
creating alternative outlets and/or more favourable sales terms. 
·  Territorial  dependence  mechanisms.  Spatial  proximity  and  shared  public  facilities, 
public  infrastructures,  university  centre,  labour  market,  geographical  indication, 
mecanicaly force the parties to cooperate. 
 
Joint and specific investments – difficult to reallocate to alternative uses without loss – are 
likely to generate a quasi-income resulting from bi- or multilateral cooperation. Mazé and 
Ménard (2010) show that from the case of the bovine inter-professions in the west of France, 
a special transactional scheme inserted into a multilateral organisation induces a pay-off. The 
repetition of transactions and the accumulation of information on individual behaviour within 
a  stable  framework  contribute  to  lowering  the  transaction  costs  which  in  turn  ensures 
longevity to the relations and their scope. This information – reputation – can even be shared 
by the professional communities and become the guide to subsequent transactional choices 
(Greif, 2005). Investments designed to reduce production costs can have similar effects and 
be wisely used to create “cooperative dependence” (Aoki, 2001).  
1.2.  Institutional change 
The research programme of the historic branch of the NIE which became formalised after the 
appearance of the first work by Douglas North (1990) focuses on the orientation of work to be 
carried  out  on  the  problems  posed  by  human  cooperation  in  an  ever  more  complex 
environment, i.e. increase in number of agents and distance of exchanges. The mechanisms 
allowing  the  pay-offs  of  the  division  of  work  and  the  exchanges  brought  about  by  this 
division require a parallel change in the institutional environment to limit the costs of this 
multiplicity of transactions. The research programme that it was to found falls into two main 
lines  of  investigation.  The  first  line  of  investigation  aims  to  establish  a  taxonomy  of 
institutions and the accompanying economic mechanisms. In the case of the Champagne LPS 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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this exercise has given rise to an abundant literature. This explores the nature of the inter-
profession – AOC relationship and its consequences on economic performance (Montaigne 
and Traversac, 2008; Barrère, 2003; Viet, Diart-Boucher, 2007). The second line seeks to 
extrapolate the consequences of historical phenomena to understand how past arrangements 
influence the present and the future. From a neo-institutionalist point of view, the changes in 
trajectory mostly proceed from an incremental change affecting the range of choices given 
and  the  nature  of  the  ways  of  dependence  (Kingston  and  Cabalerro,  2009),  with  the 
institutions at time t depending on those of time t-1. The likelihood of agents adopting an 
institutional  option  will  be  significantly  greater  when  the  latter  has  been  tested  and  used 
previously. 
The institutions are first of all defined as being the rules of the game in a society. They are 
guides to human interactions. They circumscribe the range of individual choice. They can be 
formal or informal, and serve as codes of conduct (Searle, 2005). Formal rules and unwritten 
conventions  complement  each  other  in  society.  When  the  costs  generated  by  economic 
relations,  the  costs  of  transactions,  are  analysed,  it  is  observed  that  organisations  are  a 
consequence  of  the  costs  for  which  they  were  created.  Organisations  include  political, 
economic, social and educational bodies. These are groups of individuals marked out by a 
common object established to achieve a common objective. In the vine-growing and wine-
producing world, the wealth of different forms of organisation demonstrates the variety of 
objectives of the groups of players that they represent. Organisations can also adopt objectives 
to ensure their own survival, independently from that of the players who have conceived those 
organisations. 
Distinguishing the rules underlying the strategy analysis of the players is an indispensable 
prerequisite  to  a  theory  of  institutions  (Ménard,  2003).  To  proceed  in  this  direction,  the 
individual behaviour of agents and their collective behaviour must be understood through 
their  organization  strategies.  The  assumptions  on  behavior  made  by  neo-institutionalist 
analysis distinguish it from the standard economy. In neo-institutional analysis, the major 
effect  of  institutions  through  influencing  behavior  is  to  reduce  uncertainty  (North,  1990). 
They  establish a stable  structure of human interactions which is not necessarily the most 
effective but which reduces the psychological pressure on the agents. The non-coincidence of 
behaviour  toward  individual  maximisation  and  the  attainment  of  the  best  social  output 
through cooperation is one of the central lines of inquiry in game theory. The solutions of 
these models are obvious when the games are repeated. When the interactions between the 
identified players are renewed and when there are a small number of players, cooperation 
becomes a spontaneous solution. On the other hand, cooperation is difficult to maintain when 
the number of players is large and the information on individual behaviour is costly (Greif, 
2005). When the game is played a single time, it can lead to a solution of the prisoner’s 
dilemma type. When it is repeated many times, defection is not the dominant solution. Indeed 
in an iterative game, there is often no dominant solution. Players act by reacting to the game 
of other players. Cooperation can occur even without any instrument of coercion especially in 
regional system where face to face interactions predominantly shape economic activities. The 
literature on the subject is immense over all of the social science disciplines, in economy and 
in law (McAdams, 2008). In practice, the difficulty in obtaining information on the reciprocal 
strategies  of  agents  is  the  central  problem  in  any  cooperation,  whence  the  importance  of 
intermediary organisations allowing strategies to be displayed and adjusted. The contracts, 
written or tacit, also help to partially get around this difficulty by offering a reading of the 
strategies  of  the  contract  signatories.  Primary  function  is  to  provide  explicit  ex-ante 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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intentions, rather than to provide legal guarantees for the commitments of one or other party 
(Brousseau and Glachant, 2001). 
The capacity of agents for organisational innovation is expressed mainly through incentives to 
cooperate. These operate through systems of bonuses rewarding the respect of commitments 
to cooperate, or penalising opportunist behaviour. The guarantee that commitments will be 
honoured arises from complementary mechanisms activated within and outside the bilateral 
contract agreed upon by the agents. A third party playing the role of litigation arbiter ex-post 
can intervene in both public and private tribunals, e.g. the inter-profession of Champagne 
wines  has  an  arbitration  commission  for  transaction-related  litigation.  Peer  judgment 
guarantees that the opposing parties will not have to face a judge who is totally foreign to the 
special economy and technological idiosyncrasic constraints of the sector.  
Historically, economic development arises in an institutional framework of coercive policies. 
The essential point in the research on the processes of economic development nevertheless 
remains  to  understand  under  what  conditions  voluntary  cooperation  can  be  maintained 
without  a  Hobbesian  solution  of  constraint  by  a  State  to  create  the  conditions  for  a 
cooperative solution
2. For sometimes the coercive power of the State has been used in  a 
contrary sense to economic development or at the will of economic agents, complicating the 
strategy of the agents in place. The extension in use of the AOC/PDO in the 1970s was 
encouraged by the French State, which was following its own rural development purposes in 
favour  of  mediteranean  vineyards.  It  dramatically  affected  this  quality  of  the  label  and 
reduced the ability of agents of the northern vineyards to regulate theirs owns AOC/PDO. 
The supposed stability of institutions raises unanswered questions on the way in which they 
evolve  and  are  transformed.  This  leaves  the  question  at  the  heart  of  the  concerns  of 
development analysis. From informal conventions set up within the wine growing community 
to laws on agricultural orientation, continual changes influence the behaviour of economic 
agents and their organisations. These institutional changes arise from complex processes that 
are laborious to interpret because they are generally at the margin of several institutional 
forms (Greif and Laitin, 2004). These institutions typically change incrementaly more than by 
rupture. The formal rules may change abruptly, but the informal constraints embedded in the 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct are unpredictable. These cultural constraints link the 
past to the present and future and largely determine the trajectory of economic organisations 
and the strategic options observed
3. 
The legal guarantee arrangements have their own rules for change and are made to last, with 
high inertia. Understanding development trajectories implies understanding how institutional 
                                                           
2 In HOBBES' acceptance of public power the civil state is founded by a contract between individuals and the 
sovereign. According to this contract, individuals transfer their so-called "natural" rights, with the exception of 
inalienable rights, to a central authority, the Sovereign, depositary of the State. The contract is based on more 
than mere consent. It sets up a "common power" capable of imposing respect for the conventions by penal 
sanction. The Sovereign guarantees that men will not fall back into the state of nature (Hobbes, Leviathan, 
1651). 
3 The hypothesis on evolution advanced by Alchian in 1950 suggests “a ubiquitous competition” eliminating 
inferior institutions and rewarding by survival those most able to solve human problems (Alchian, 1950). Now, a 
study of institutions in the agricultural sector shows that many of them stand the test of time. They appear more 
to add to each other than to substitute for each other. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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changes maintain cooperation within a game whose rules evolve. The “reputational” model of 
Klein (1992) bases the guarantee of execution on the matrix of pay-offs in a cooperative game 
where the entry and exit costs for cooperation are an obstacle to great changes. Anticipated 
pay-offs as prices and costs evolved infer the agent behavior with more or less latency. 
The complementarity of enforcement mechanisms between formal and informal mechanisms, 
of private institutions embedded in a regulatory framework enables a reduction in the costs of 
information and negotiation when multilateral agreements are activated. 
 
2.  Technical and organisational singularities in the Champagne LPS 
The Champagne market is mainly characterised by the distribution of specific assets over a 
long time span between two families of players. On one side, the vine growers hold a major 
proportion of land suitable for growing AOC/PDO grapes. The merchants possess commercial 
infrastructures and brands that enable the effective marketing of Champagne, in particular for 
export. The complementary nature of these assets induces a "localised" cooperation for the 
production of a AOC/PDO with a very high added-value, which is not exceptional for a wine 
growing region; but in the LPS Champagne, the complementarity arises in different terms 
with a strong willingness to cooperate upstream and downstream (Lanotte and Traversac, 
2011). 
2.1.  The distribution of assets between the wine grower and merchant, the basis 
of regional economic cooperation 
By the late 19
th century, the competition between wines of the south, less costly to produce 
than those of northern climes, forced the Champagne merchants to play the differentiation 
card. They found themselves confronted with classic phenomena of the agricultural economy, 
production highs and lows, fraud, counterfeit and speculative behaviour (Boussard, 2007).  In 
the  inter-war  years,  the  industry  and  the  State  sketched  out  the  two  main  routes  in  the 
regulation  of  the  wine  market,  the  AOC/PDO  schedule  and  the  discipline  of  upstream-
downstream relations which helped to correct the hazards in flows and prices and to increase 
quality-based investments. But it was not until after the war that these mechanisms were set 
definitively into place for the long term. From 1920 onwards, Champagne adopted a valuing 
scheme  for  special  protection,  based  on  AOC/PDO-inter-profession  regulation  peculiar  to 
itself,  anchored  explicitly  in  usages  sometimes  going  far  back  in  time
4.  There  is  a  clear 
distinction between upstream grape production control on the one hand and downstream wine 
production control on the other hand. The AOC/PDO is a public asset without any affectation 
of property rights to any particular economic agent. It can therefore benefit all the players of 
an LPS linked to the AOC/PDO. There is, however, a strong asymmetry in the control of the 
                                                           
4 Initiated by land owners, this initiative was to have echoes from the side of the merchants. “From the second 
half of the 19
th century, the merchants set themselves up as convinced defenders of the Appellation Champagne, 
in particular through their union”   (Garcia, 1986, p66). From the choice of referring back to the real or 
imaginary precedence of old practices came the PDO scheme in its current form. Records of these practices are 
to be found in all kinds of archive, writings by the erudite, account ledgers or growers’ records of merchant 
firms. The company Ruinart Père et Fils founded in 1729 and Moët et Chandon in 1743, among the oldest of 
firms, have been the subject of instructive monographs in this connection. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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production rules. These result exclusively from a choice of land owner representatives. The 
State acts as a guarantor of a general doctrine that incidentally is quite blurred (Sylvander et 
al., 2011). The separating of functions calls for a strong mutual dependence between these 
two  categories  of  player,  complementary  asset  holders,  who  regularly  highlight  the 
representatives of one or other families (de Brissis, 1999). 
The translation of the period of transactions, from wine – a stable product – to grapes – a 
perishable commodity – has strong consequences on how the transactions are carried out. It 
induces the planification of vertical relations adapted to the hostage situation in which the 
grower may find himself following harvesting if he has no wine-facilities for long storage of 
its harvest. During the second half of the 20
th century, the two players therefore introduced 
marketing contracts so as to ensure a regular offer on the final market and to secure the vine 
growing investment
5. Until 1940, there was no real regulation of supply contracts and the 
merchants  were  in  a  privileged  position  owing  to  the  virtual  absence  of  any  competition 
among  wine  growers  on  the  final  market.  There  were  nevertheless  attempts  at  partial 
regulation before the war, in particular to limit the destabilising effect of hazard on the price 
of grapes. 
2.2.  The three periods in modern Champagne history 
From 1941, three epochs marks the growth of the vineyard and the forms of institutional 
arrangements  (Lanotte  and  Traversac,  2011).  The  most  visible  part  of  these  institutional 
arrangements, the contracts, through the rules they carry with them, reveals both i. the balance 
of power between merchants and vine growers (cf. table 1), and ii. the convention for market 
regulation, prevailing during each epoch (planning, multilateral contract, deregulation). 
·  Between  1941  and  1959,  a  quasi-administrative  instrument  was  introduced  by  the 
authorities, ratified by the vine growers and the merchants, to monitor production and flow 
standards.  This  instrument  relied  on  an  organisation,  the  Comité  Interprofessionnel  des 
Vins de Champagne. From its origin in 1959, the CIVC regulated the exchanges on the 
basis of a principle of an administrative allocation of the totality of the Champagne grape 
supply.  It  centralised  the  attribution  of  order  forms  called  “bons  déclaratifs  non 
échangeables”
6.  Each  merchant  had  an  allocation  based  on  an  historical  reference.  The 
regulation system was incremented in 1950 by indexing the price of grapes to the average 
price  of  a  bottle  of  Champagne.  This  reference  price,  called  “prix  obligatoire”,  was 
calculated  from  the  average  ex-cellar  selling  price.  This  principle  turned  out  to  be 
particularly advantageous for the vine growers, to the point where in 1955 the merchants 
refused to buy any grapes. Repeated conflicts led the CIVC to interrupt the administrative 
regulation and to adopt a more flexible management of market relations. But the principle 
                                                           
5 The representatives of the merchants and of the Marne wine growers are in the habit of having discussions 
within the Commission Spéciale de la Champagne Délimitée, the so-called Châlons
5 Commission. But in spite of 
everything, in the mid-twentieth century there still did not exist one single “contractual framework” for the 
whole of the inter-profession, each fixing the contractual conditions for the exchange of grapes on a year by year 
basis, in a market that may be likened to a “spot” market (to the highest bidder without constraints). The wine 
growers, who were more numerous and whose survival depended a lot on the purchasing terms offered by the 
merchants, were in a difficult situation related in particular to their higher than normal production costs. 
6 For the record, on these dates almost the whole of the production was the subject of transactions in grapes or 
clear wine. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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of an agreement on the general Champagne strategy would be preserved in the succeeding 
regulation scheme. 
·  Between  1959  and  1989,  the  regime  became  one  of  multilateral  agreement  based  on 
voluntary subscription by the largest number of growers and merchants to a permanent 
contractual commitment. The strength of this agreement would be in proactively defining 
the concrete modalities for bilateral contractual relations. Five successive inter-professional 
contracts  were  adopted.  The  inter-professional  contract  included  a  set  of  incentives  to 
cooperation (see below). The measures adopted by the representatives of unions, members 
of  the  CIVC,  were  made  obligatory  by  the  public  authorities  who  “extended”  the 
agreements to the whole of a product, the AOC/PDO wines of Champagne, by ministerial 
decree
7. The grape price / bottle price index, an ever-increasing ratio during the period, 
shows explicitly how the grape growers obtain a clear adjustment of the bargaining power 
in  their  favour.  This  observation  is  in  part  an  explanation  for  the  rupture  of  the  inter-
professional contract in 1989. Chambolle and Gaucher emphasise the nature of cooperation 
mechanisms, those relating to a variation of bargaining power towards the vine grower 
(Chambolle, 2000; Gaucher et al., 2005). Through the introduction of alternative marketing 
instruments, investments in own brands by the cooperatives and direct sales by the wine 
growers, the vineyard’s negotiating power increased within the inter-profession by breaking 
the merchants’ monopsony. It used this “re-adjusted” balance of power to obtain a share of 
the profit in the industry  that  was advantageous to it (Chambolle, 2000). This contract 
consort  with  the  formidable  development  of  the  Champagne  market.  In  30  years,  the 
vineyard area was to more than double and the number of bottles of Champagne sold was 
multiplied by five. 
·  From  1990,  the  design  of  the  inter-professional  contract  changed  form  and  lost  its 
consistency because of the application of a counter-regulatory doctrine to the Champagne 
market. After 1993, a very strict interpretation of Community competition law (art. 101-109 
of treaty  of  European  Union functioning) was to prohibit the price clause.  From being 
obligatory, the price of grapes in the inter-professional contract became “indicative”, and 
then  “observed”.  The  value  of  each  transaction  had  from  then  on  to  be  set  by  mutual 
agreement  between  buyers  and  sellers.  To  stay  in  compliance  with  the  Commission’s 
decision, the price index is no longer designated in the inter-professional contract model. 
Nevertheless, professionals in the sector remain attached to the use of this reference. This 
custom attenuates price differences, improving coordination in the industry and allowing 
the planning of supplies to the merchants by limiting speculative phenomena, in particular 
temporary overbidding on price, a source of instability and tension. 
                                                           
7  Up  to  1989  these  agreements  were  published  by  the  government  commissioner  who  validated  the  inter-
professional agreement in order to give it the force of law.  51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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Table 1: The successive phases in the regulation of Champagne wines. 
  The  inter-war  years 
market   
The administrative 







professional contract  
The completeness of 
the contract  
The median inter-
professional contract 
Liberalising of the 
market and the  
bilateral contract 
Period  1918-1941  1941-1959  1959-1989  1989-…. 
Share  of 
bargaining 
power (α) 
αm> αv with 
m: merchant 
v: vine growers 
 
αn> αv 
GP=24->28% BP with 
GP: grappe price 
BP: bootle price 
αn ~ αv 
GP=34% BP 




1911 – Scale of 
vintages 
1930 - Creation of 
the AOC/PDO  
1935 - Commission  
de Châlons  
1941 - Creation of the 
CIVC 
Frequent adjustments 
in the clauses of the 
inter-professional 
contract to the needs 
of the conjoncture 
Rupture from 1989 
to 1993 





Result  Stable vineyard area 
10 000→12 000 ha 
Sales of 30/40 
million bottles 




fluctuations in the 
price of grapes from 
year to year – 1.1 FF 
(1922), 10/11 FF 
(1926), 1.3 FF 
(1935) 
Vineyard area of 
12 000 ha 
Sales of 30/40 million 
bottles 
Strong growth of 
vineyards   
12 520→29 035 ha 
(+132 %) 
Large increase in sales 
42→249 million 
bottles (+ 489%) 
France + 438 % - 
Export: + 596 % 
Moderate inter-year 
variations - (~ 1/1,3) 
Slower pursuit of 
growth -  
30 000 →34 000 ha  
Increase in sales - 
250→352 million 
bottles 
From 3 Euros to 6 
Euros  
The Champagne industry managed to create value despite an offer limited in volume by joint 
investments and very close coordination of the flow of investments
8. This success is partly 
related to the cooperative relationships that became established upstream of the industry, to 
                                                           
8 The price of Champagne PDO grapes is 10 to 15 times greater than for table wine. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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the discipline of the economic agents and to the introduction of various types of enforcement 
mechanism. 
2.3.  The instruments to guarantee cooperation 
The regulation scheme set up in Champagne for vertical vine grower-merchant relations is 
designed like all contracts with three specifications: i. investments in the assets required for 
cooperation, ii. coordination tools and enforcement process, iii. rules of distribution of the 
quasi-rent. The long-term commitment of buyer and seller aims to facilitate the coordination 
of flows along the supply chain. It should be noted that this contractual mechanism serves 
explicitly to reduce the uncertainty. The actual specifications of the inter-professional contract 
mention  the  rewards  attributed  to  growers  and  merchants  who  play  the  contractualisation 
game and the sanctions applied for deviant behaviour. The strength of the succession of these 
agreements lies in the capacity of the Champagne players to create institutional innovations 
ensuring their enforcement. This mechanism is based on third parties called in by the private 
players to make the contractual commitments enforceable on the one hand, and on the other 
hand on incentives to modify the balance of power between growers and merchants. 
The inter-professional contract includes several clauses aimed at facilitating cooperation and 
adhesion  to  the  contract.  The  main  incentive  is  based  on  a  bonus  for  commitment,  and 
appeared in the 1967 contract, to be later made systematic, and designed to reward only those 
growers who respect their contract agreement to its full term. It is financed by a fee on all 
grape, grape-must, and “clear-wine” transactions at 6% to 8% of the value of the transactions. 
The contract was to change design and name – quality bonus – but remained in the spirit of a 
reward for the stability of the bilateral relation. Added to this are various clauses favouring 
contract signatories in procedures for attributing rights to produce or sell. Priority for the 
marketing of wines was given to producers under contract, first of all through wine circulation 
“vouchers”, and then through the release of “reserve” wines. The change in the order of the 
attribution of the plantation rights involved a revision of priorities written into the law on the 
French agricultural politics and local schemes. The tacit agreement of this revision implies 
that  there  was  overall  approval  by  players  in  regional  agricultural  regulation,  public 
authorities  and  agricultural  unions.  Public  and  private  third  parties  were  solicited  by  the 
Champagne producers to arbitrate in conflicts between upstream and downstream. The public 
authorities were and remained the natural third party in the wine world when it is a question 
of regulation.  The most general form of its action in favour of quality wines concerns the 
regulations on GI. By setting up a coherent AOC/PDO labeling scheme, the French State, and 
after the European Union, contribute to the standardizing of production and products. Thereby 
they  facilitate the organization of exchanges by reducing  controlling  and measuring costs 
(Sylvander et al., 2011). The extension of agreements by ministerial decree or prefectural
9 
order  made  participation  obligatory  for  agents  in  the  functioning  of  the  inter-professional 
instrument in its two dimensions. The principle of obligatory voluntary contributions lent a 
unity  of  action  to  the  producers  of  the  Champagne  AOC/PDO  which  very  significantly 
enhanced  the  effectiveness  of  collective  action.  It  reduced  opportunistic  behavior  by 
prohibiting  alternative  options.  It  also  reduced  the  risks  of  moral  lapses  by  imposing  the 
monitoring  of  technical  installations.  The  public  action  applies  the  private  strategy  at 
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numerous levels and on various scales. The international EU-Third State agreements on the 
protection of PDO contribute to the value of this scheme. 
Added  to  public  instruments  for  the  arbitration  of  litigation  and  civil  and  administrative 
tribunals are private tribunals. The extended agreement authorises the CIVC to nullify a non-
compliant contract and block the corresponding transaction. It can impose fines (up to 80 000 
Euros), engage a civil action or require competent administrations (Ministry of Agriculture). 
The inter-profession is a private organism endowed with delegations from public services and 
enjoys nearly the same prerogatives as a market regulation authority. Its actions protect the 
two parties from any deviation. The policy of wine growers’ union has been and remains to 
favour vertical relations, manifest in the large efforts that the SGV (Syndicat Général des 
Vignerons – growers’ union) has devoted to promoting the inter-professional contract. It does 
nevertheless encourage the creation of alternative industrial organisations, able to compete 
with the merchant at the marketing stage. The development of direct sales (by the producers 
or the cooperatives) directly strengthens the negotiating power of the SGV. Pre-eminence 
over the marketing functions that the merchants had possessed for a long time was to develop 
from the late 1960s. The sale of Champagne by the grower developed, mainly in French and 
EU markets. In sixty years the segmentation of the industry has greatly developed following 
the strong vertical integration of marketing functions by the wine grower. This strategy aims 
both to capture value and to re-adjust the balance of power with the merchants (Chambolle, 
2000). The development of second level cooperatives became part of an industrial policy 
imposed by the SGV on the UMC (Union des Maisons de Champagne – merchants’union), 
with clauses written in to the inter-professional contract. 
2.4.  Territorial clauses 
The geographic proximity of wine growers and merchants means that cooperation is easy, 
resulting in savings on the costs of communication and transport (Torre, 2006). The adoption 
of  common  rules  of  the  PDO  type  and  of  coordination  mechanisms  stems  almost 
automatically  from  this  proximity  constraint.  This  logic  when  applied  to  Marshall  type 
externalities  of  proximity  produces  synergy  effects  in  most  LPS  (Torre,  2006).  In 
Champagne, the SGV and the UMC have made the choice of territorial cooperation, totally 
prohibiting external alternatives. 
From the beginning of the 20
th century, the SGV and the UMC instituted a rule on exclusive 
territorial  cooperation  by  prohibiting  the  incoming  and  outgoing  flow  raw  materials 
(transcribed in the laws of 1908 and 1927). Uniquely in the French wine industry, under its 
brand names, the merchant can sell no wine other than Champagne. As for the wine grower, 
he  cannot  send  grapes  or  grape  must  outside  the  AOC/PDO  area.  This  rule  strongly 
constrained the players to cooperate by raising the cost of alternative options. The AOC/PDO 
decree  prevents  the  substitution  of  southern  AOC  grapes  in  Champagne  production  sites. 
Transferring a wine making establishment to another region is still possible for the merchant. 
This strategic choice does, however, involve costs of replicating industrial plant. Though it 
does  not  totally  proscribe  the  adoption  of  this  strategic  (Mumm  in  California,  Moët  in 
Argentina, Bollinger in Chile), it is strongly dissuasive. 
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3.  Self-enforcement  of  vertical  relations  through  promotion  investment  by 
Champagne firms 
In practice, the cooperative relation between the grower and the merchant in our case depends 
mainly  on  the  complementary  nature  of  their  respective  assets.  The  inter-professional 
agreement and the willingness of these two players to cooperate are, however, insufficient to 
explain the relative contractual stability. This would be to ignore the rivalry between the two 
players.  The  wine  growers  themselves  market  Champagne  under  the  denomination  “de 
propriété”, e.g. estate wine. There is nothing to prevent the merchant from producing grapes. 
Engaged  in  a  compete/cooperate  relation,  the  growers  and  the  Champagne  firms  find 
themselves in a different position from a simple vertical relation of supply/demand. “The 
grape market […], is thus positioned in a quite original structure of vertical relations where 
downstream competition between merchants who have made marketing investments (brand 
development,  sale  networks)  find  themselves  exacerbated  by  the  supply  of  Champagne 
appellation grapes: production capacity is by definition limited and the quantities offered to 
the merchants are limited by the direct marketing strategies of growers and cooperatives” 
(Gaucher et al., 2005, p1). 
Once they had been dispossessed of the innovations, the grape varieties and the wine making 
methods that have accompanied the development of Champagne, the producers were left with 
only one specific asset, the Champagne AOC/PDO as a brand. This relied on two types of 
complementary resource: i. a monopoly on production and an exclusive claim to the brand by 
the  growers  alone  in  the  AOC/PDO,  ii.  the  commercial  investments  of  the  merchants  to 
uphold  its  reputation  and  prevent  substitution  by  wines  of  other  competing  origins.  The 
growers were aware of the major role the merchants had played in enhancing the value of 
their wines. Investments in reputation were mainly made by the merchants. “… without the 
merchants’ marketing efforts which have forged the renown of a sparkling wine, Champagne 
today  would  have  been  just  one  among  many.  Growers  would  have  less  revenue  and 
Champagne and all that goes with it would not have known such prosperity. In his wake, the 
merchant has enabled the development of many activities ancillary to Champagne, and the 
arrival of the harvester- handlers too, who also market Champagne wines and profit from the 
reputation of the big brands” (Garcia, 1986, p74). 
We suggest that the promotion efforts by Champagne firms to  a large  extent explain the 
relative  stability  of  contractual  relations  by  making  the  agreement  self-enforcing.  Other 
authors may stress the importance of security of supply for the merchant so that he may invest 
massively in promotion and distribution (Gauchet et al., 2002), but they do not sufficiently 
emphasise  the  size  of  commercial  investments  prior  to  the  relation  to  explain  the  very 
existence of the agreement. “… in the setting up of this delicate balance, the chronology of 
investments is crucial. If the merchants have not invested massively and sufficiently early on 
in the reputation of their own brand  associated  with the PDO, the development of direct 
marketing of a standard product by the vineyard reduces the merchant’s supply capacity and 
creates  competitive  pressure  which  hinders  the  emergence  of  merchants’  brands  aimed  at 
higher quality market sectors. Up to now, apart from Champagne (where merchants’ brands 
invested in the reputation of high quality products very early on) very few brands in PDO 
regions  have  acquired  an  international  image  […]”  (Giraud-Héraud  et  al.,  2002,  p8). 
Advertising should not be seen merely as a signal of quality but also as a regulatory tool for 
vertical relations (Xie and Wei, 2009). The advertising effort made by the merchants has 
effects  not  only  on  the  final  market  but  also  on  the  upstream-downstream  relation. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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Investments  in  specific  assets  devoted  to  the  promotion  of  Champagne  wines  by  the 
merchants stems from the stability of upstream-downstream cooperation. 
In  a  comparative  study  of  Champagne  and  Bordeaux  wines,  Réjalot  shows  that  the 
communication strategies are different in these two vine growing areas. Although “it is the 
big  brands  of  the  merchants  and  the  CIVC  who  have  the  largest  Champagne  advertising 
budgets and who use the main media for advertising […] the essential part of communication 
and advertising is done by the CIVB
10 …” (Réjalot, 2000, p428-429). There are various types 
of  advertiser  for  promoting  Champagne  wines.  Communication  can  come  from  merchant 
firms, cooperatives or harvester-handlers when they are communicating about their own brand 
or  product,  or  from  the  inter-profession  or  the  unions  when  they  are  highlighting  the 
Champagne AOC/PDO. It is the big brands of the merchants and the CIVC who take on the 
largest part of advertising costs with their important budgets. It is therefore not surprising that 
the amounts spent on promotion by the inter-profession and the merchants in Champagne 
wines are distributed differently from other wine growing regions (Lanotte and Deluze, 2010). 
At the CIVC, the budget (a little under 20 million Euros) is shared equally between technical 
projects and promotional campaigns at about 6 to 7 million Euros
11. Out of 23 million Euros 
of media advertising investment in 2007
12, the top ten Champagne firms were responsible for 
60%. The share of investments borne by all the Champagne firms is estimated at about 80% 
(Onivins,  2008).  The  CIVC  releases  generic  type  advertising  communications
13.  The 
Champagne  firms  produce  brand  advertising  that  is  chiefly  intended  to  underpin  their 
commercial actions. But the latter by investing in their own brands convey the generic image 
of Champagne at the same time, contributing to the enhancement of the reputation of the 
AOC/PDO. These private Champagne brands are totally in allegiance to the PDO, which in 
return benefits the whole industry
14. 
Creating a brand of Champagne wine requires the authorisation of the CIVC, to avoid the 
uncontrolled multiplying of agents in the industry (e.g. retailer/store brand types). Apart from 
advertising budgets, the major brands are able to be effective in maintaining the reputation of 
the brand/AOC pair to an extent that the wine growers, the cooperatives and the CIVC cannot 
match. The oligopoly of merchant is responsible for ensuring the presence of Champagne on 
external markets through commercial networks controlled by the multinationals in the wines 
and  spirits  sector.  This  symbiosis  between  the  private  brands  and  the  AOC/PDO  is 
emphasised by all involved in Champagne (de Brissis, 1999). The AOC/PDO and the wine 
growers depend on this strategic assets held by the merchants. The Vine Growers’ Union 
develops the following argument: Champagne wine is produced from AOC/PDO grapes of 
                                                           
10 Comité Interprofessionnel des Vins de Bordeaux. 
11 For comparison: the turnover for Bordeaux wine was 3.84 billion Euros (for 710 million bottles sold) and for 
Champagne 4.45 billion Euros (323 million bottles) in 2008. 
12 Media costs in the alcoholic drinks sector are estimated at close to 320 million Euros, the highest investiments 
being in the beer and whisky sectors (Source: TNS Media Intelligence - Viniflhor). The wine sector represents 
only 13 % of these total costs (7 % for Champagne). 
13  Symbolic advertising message “The only Champagne is Champagne” signify it is forbidden to usurp the 
AOC. 
14 Rejabot takes the example of a comic book: A single red line on a bottle unambiguously evokes a bottle of 
Champagne in the reader’s mind,  Mumm Cordon Rouge as it happens, cf. Hergé, “The Crab with the Golden 
Claws”, Casterman, 1960 (p.13 and 18) or Goscinny & Uderzo, “Asterix and the Banquet”, Dargaud, 1965, p.18. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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very high quality, and advertising must above all promote the Champagne AOC. In practice, 
the suppliers of grapes like the cooperatives give priority to firms who convey the Champagne 
image. “We propose – and the growers have no objection to this – that there should be priority 
of supply to the ten or fifteen large firms who promote the Champagne image. The identity of 
these Champagne firms must be defended, with their craftsmanship and distinctive product 
from a process beginning with clear wine. Today, some adopt the opposite reasoning, with 
highlighting of the brand. But a brand is above all a marketing affair, and if tomorrow supply 
problems continue, who can say whether some firms might secure supplies elsewhere, selling 
wines  that  would  not  be  entitled  to  the  name  Champagne,  but  would  be  sold  under  the 
prestigious  Champagne  brand  name?  And  indeed  this  is  already  happening  in  the  United 
States”
 15. 
On several occasions, over advertising campaigns for Champagne brands that did not clearly 
mention the AOC/PDO  has led the SGV to start with the CIVC an  action to obtain that 
merchant be ordered to explicitely mention the origin of the wine and promote the AOC/PDO. 
Indeed, some merchants consider the grapes as merely raw material (provided they are of high 
quality) and are turning more and more to branding. But the danger is that all feeling of 
belonging could vanish. What could disappear if the AOC/PDO is abandoned in favour of 
their own respective brands is an identifying sign for both external recognition by consumers 
and internal recognition within the industry. The AOC/PDO with its reputation has not only 
an informative function, but also an intangible idiosyncratic character, binding together the 
members of this AOC/PDO (Torre, 2002). Moreover, as pointed out by Eymard-Duvernay, 
the reciprocal confidence between buyer and seller that is necessary in exchanges is founded 
not  only  on  reputation  or  fame  but  also  on  commitment  (Eymard-Duvernay,  1994).  This 
commitment often takes the form of specific non-recoverable investments – sunk costs. In the 
case of Champagne, it is the investment in the  Champagne appellation that is “specific”, 
since, unlike the brand name, it is attached to the PDO area. 
And further, the major Champagne firms are diversifying by setting up abroad. They produce 
sparkling wines in the United States, Cava in Spain, marketing them under their “umbrella 
brands”, freeing themselves from the geographical limits imposed by the AOC/PDO. The 
merchants  justify  their  action  by  the  need  to  control  the  distribution  channels  in  these 
countries with local products required for effective marketing. The risk is then that the brands 
might gradually leave aside the AOC/PDO and turn to less costly raw materials. 
                                                           
15  P.  Leroy,  deputy  secretary  to  the  CGT  Champagne  union,  quoted  at  the  address 
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Conclusion 
In this article we have tried to show that the organisation of localised production systems 
(LPS) can be re-interpreted through a diachronic analysis of their institutional arrangements. 
The regulation of the Champagne system is the result of an institutional history that through 
repeated exchanges has enabled a dual and incremental process of strategy alignment by the 
two parties in the presence of contractual mechanisms with the regulation standards in force
16. 
Grower and merchant have had to cooperate to schedule production, more especially since the 
production cycles are very long. This has given rise to a long-term understanding and an 
idiosyncratic  organisational  instrument,  the  inter-profession  ￿  AOC/PDO.  To  reduce 
transaction costs, there is centralised coordination of the various stages in the writing of the 
contract.  Two  unions,  representatives  of  whom  preside  over  the  CIVC  simultaneously, 
negotiate and draw up the parameters of the bilateral contract between the two families, and 
its  operational  details  –  the  inter-professional  supply  contract,  the  management  tools,  the 
juridicial protection of the PDO, concertation with the public authorities, R&D priorities. The 
originality of the regulation of this LPS lies in the way this central resource is made up and 
the asymmetrical distribution of investments agreed in order to ensure a strong and durable 
differentiation of these products on the markets. The willingness expressed during the inter-
professional negotiation process to share the value equitably legitimises the permanence of 
the agreement (Rasselet, 2001). The contractual agreements concluded in Champagne both 
generally and bilaterally are applied more or less completely to satisfy a strategy shared by 
vineyard and merchant management. This common vision has gradually spread to the whole 
of  the  agents,  to  an  extent  that  the  determination  of  the  union  leaders,  essential  when 
regulation was first being introduced, seems secondary today. 
We have shown that several forms of arrangement have succeeded each other to make the 
equilibrium  durable  in  the  long  term.  The  strength  of  the  Champagne  LPS  depends  on 
relatively dense and complex incentives to cooperate. Local inter-professional cooperation has 
been effective because it is stabilised by appropriate guarantee mechanisms and has many 
times been adapted to economic and political circumstances. Their stability does result from 
processes  designed  to  reduce  the  benefits  of  cheating  behaviour,  by  self-enforcing 
mechanisms (Mazé, 2007). If the agents respect their commitments, it is above all because 
any  breaking  of  the  agreements  is  costly  and  uncertain.  Added  to  the  inter-professional 
contracts are mechanisms of a private nature aimed at enhancing the benefits of cooperation. 
In particular, the advertising investment of the Champagne firms in favour of the AOC/PDO 
contributes significantly to the stability of inter-professional relations. By improving the well-
being of all the agents, this investment is both a mechanism for improvement in consumers’ 
willingness to pay and a real means of cohesion between vineyard and merchant. This enables 
both horizontal coordination, by avoiding direct competition between the merchant and the 
harvester-handlers,  and  vertical  coordination  within  the  industry  itself.  The  way  the 
Champagne union leaders have played out these various mechanisms makes the Champagne 
experience particularly interesting (David, 1994). 
 
                                                           
16 The three periods from the Secxond World War to today are to be divided into fourteen contractual sub-
periods. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association – Barcelona2011 
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